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Entry and access to competencies abroad:  
Emerging Market Firms versus Advanced Market Firms 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article is about Emerging Market Firms (EMFs) acquiring firms in advanced economies. 
We claim that EMFs adopt a different entry behavior from that of Advanced Market Firms 
(AMFs). Namely, as a first hypothesis we claim that, AMFs undertake a partial (rather than a 
complete) acquisition when they wish to avoid the dispersion of the bundle of information and 
knowledge residing in the target company, while EMFs are more likely to prefer a greater degree 
of ownership and control as they lack the needed experience to deal with the relevant complexity 
and to manage partnerships. Furthermore, we claim that EMFs experience a higher propensity to 
control the local partner the higher the institutional distance with the host country, since they 
enjoy a better institutional environment when they invest in advanced countries and, hence, they 
are less likely to need a local partner. To test our hypothesis, we developed an econometric 
analysis applied to foreign acquisitions in Italy along the decade 2001-2010 and we study the 
entry mode of AMFs and EMFs. Our result confirm the first hypothesis and shows that distances 
in property rights and investment freedom effectively increase the probability to undertake full 
acquisition for EMFs.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords (max 6): Emerging Market Firms (EMFs), entry mode, competencies, institutional 
distance, counterfactual analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
This article is about Emerging Market Firms (EMFs) acquiring firms in advanced economies. 
This goes against the grain of conventional wisdom about the fashion and direction in which 
capital, technology, and knowledge should flow in the global economy. And it represents a 
situation which extant international business theory fails to explain well. EMFs supposedly use 
international expansion in advanced countries as a springboard to compensate for their 
competitive disadvantages. In order to compete internationally, they need to overcome their own 
weaknesses quickly. Therefore, they aim to acquire capabilities and technologies such that they 
do not need to develop the same internally. Previous studies (e.g. Luo and Tung, 2007) have 
already shown that when investing in developed countries, EMFs seek sophisticated technology 
or advanced manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies. Namely, EMFs outward 
investments are triggered mainly by ‘pull’ factors, such as the desire to secure critical resources, 
acquire advanced technology, obtain managerial expertise, and gain access to consumers in key 
foreign markets, so that they can overcome their latecomer disadvantages (Mathews, 2006).  
In general, EMFs are eager to acquire technology and brands through internationalization to fill 
their resource void. Foreign firms’ willingness to sell or share their technology, know-how or 
brands due to financial exigency or restructuring needs makes it possible for EMFs to fulfill this 
need (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
Although most multinationals come from advanced countries, EMFs have made a remarkable 
entrance on the international scene in the last decade. Since the 1990s, in both developed and 
developing countries, M&A have become a more important component of inward and outward 
FDI. However, although EMFs have the ambition to become global players, their pattern of 
international expansion is supposedly different to that of their developed world counterparts 
(Guillèn and Garcia-Canal, 2009). In fact, EMFs have been relatively more successful in 
penetrating other developing countries, but relatively less successful in entering developed 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). 
Within this context, we claim that EMFs adopt a different entry behavior from that of Advanced 
Market Firms (AMFs), even when they are driven by similar motivations. Namely, we claim 
that, when acquiring a foreign company, a MNE wishing to avoid the dispersion of the bundle of 
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information and knowledge residing in the target company is more likely to preserve the value of 
the target firm’s resources by undertaking a partial (rather than a complete) acquisition. This is 
particularly true when MNEs adopt competence exploring strategies, and they experience 
important opportunities to learn from local target companies. However, this is less true for EMFs 
as they lack the needed experience to deal with the relevant complexity and to manage 
partnerships. Hence, EMFs are more likely to prefer a greater degree of ownership and control in 
the local target company. 
Additionally, EMFs experience a higher propensity to control the local partner the higher the 
institutional distance with the host country. In fact, as EMFs investing in advanced countries 
enjoy a better institutional environment there, they are less likely to need a local partner (to 
reduce the relevant uncertainty). 
In order to test our hypotheses, we developed an econometric analysis applied to foreign 
acquisitions in Italy along the decade 2001-2010. The availability of such a sample allows us to 
analyze the uniqueness of EMFs’ behavior and to compare their entry choice with AMF, thus 
providing a sort of “natural” counterfactual. 
This work is original in various respects. Although both the literature on the MNEs’ entry mode 
and the studies focusing on EMFs are vast, the latter’s entry strategy in developed countries has 
not received much attention so far. Here, we focus on factors explaining the degree of ownership 
in local companies acquired by EMFs. Namely, thanks to a detailed database for Italy, we 
compare EMFs with AMFs, thus addressing the crucial issue of “the unique or special features of 
the home country environment” influencing international entry mode (Brouthers and Hennart, 
2007; Li and Peng, 2008). Indeed, in this paper we test the uniqueness of EMFs by comparing 
their entry mode behavior to that of MNEs from advanced countries.  
Additionally, MNEs’ entry mode choice has been widely investigated by international business 
scholars mainly focusing on determinants and patterns of the choice acquisitions vs. greenfield 
initiatives, or wholly owned subsidiaries vs. joint ventures (for recent reviews, see Dikova and 
van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Hennart, 2009). Instead, we focus on the level of control and the equity 
share in cross border acquisitions, an issue that has not received much research attention so far 
(for an exhaustive survey and discussion, see Chari and Chang, 2009).   
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The paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents our conceptual framework and 
testable hypotheses. The third Section presents the data and descriptive statistics, while 
econometric models and variables employed are reported in the fourth Section. The fifth Section 
illustrates and discusses the results, while the final Section summarizes the main contributions of 
the paper. 
 
2. Conceptual background and hypotheses 
Multinationals are increasingly seeking to augment, as well as exploit, their global competitive 
advantage. The emergence and growth of asset-seeking and competence-creating MNE activity 
not to exploit a particular set of ownership specific advantages but to access new ones is driving 
firms to acquire target firms abroad. Acquisitions, in particular, are being used in order to 
augment the competitive ownership-specific advantages of the investing companies by exploiting 
and accessing the capabilities and resources of particular companies.  
Several studies have identified the access to knowledge as a major motive for foreign 
acquisitions of multinational companies abroad (Anand and Delios, 2002; Anand and Kogut, 
1997; Florida, 1997; Kuemmerle, 1999). Due to the growing importance of knowledge as the 
fundamental rationale for investment, foreign entry by acquisition of local companies has 
increasingly become the primary fashion by which foreign MNCs access complementary 
resources, and information and knowledge otherwise hard to obtain (Anand and Delios, 1997; 
Meyer et al., 2009a; Meyer et al., 2009b; Phene et al., 2010). 
This is particularly true for EMFs, which systematically use international expansion as a 
springboard to develop critical resources needed to compete more effectively against their global 
rivals at home and abroad and to reduce their vulnerability to institutional and market constraints 
at home (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
According to mainstream IB theory, for the purpose of seeking strategic resources and 
capabilities, companies will choose either fully owned or majority owned acquisitions. Indeed, 
only with dominant positions can companies fully reflect their economic rationale, strategic 
ability, and resource commitment during the course of entry and operations (Caves, 1996). To 
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eliminate the opportunity cost of delaying entry, MNEs can fully take over the indigenous firms 
that control the target assets. Although such acquisitions seem to be driven by speedy entry into 
foreign nations, the underlying motive is access to complementary capabilities embedded in the 
acquired firms. MNEs that lack the complementary capabilities owned by indigenous firms may, 
for instance, have to procure reputable brands or distribution networks from local firms (Chen 
and Hennart, 2002, Chen, 2008). 
Owing to their tacit and proprietary nature, complementary capabilities owned by indigenous 
firms can be difficult to duplicate internally and their external purchase too costly to negotiate 
and contract (Chen, 2005; Chi, 1994). In such cases, one alternative to developing or procuring 
complementary capabilities is to buy out the local businesses in which the targeted assets are 
embedded. There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that MNEs use acquisitions to procure a 
wide variety of proprietary assets from indigenous firms (Anand and Delios, 2002; Caves and 
Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Within this context, the degree of ownership and control that foreign MNEs maintain on the local 
target firm becomes a crucial dimension (Brown et al., 2003; Shrader, 2001). Transaction cost 
economics is among the theories most widely used to study foreign subsidiary ownership policy 
(Makino and Neupert, 2000; Yiu and Makino, 2002; Zhao et al., 2004). It argues that the choice 
between partial and full ownership depends on the net benefits of sharing equity relative to those 
retaining full ownership. Hennart (1991) argues that investing firms tend to choose joint 
ownership with a local partner over full ownership when they need continuous access to local 
firms’ resources of, for example, knowledge and know-how, which are subject to high market 
transaction costs (Makino and Neupert, 2002). Empirical studies suggest that these arguments 
hold not only for greenfield joint ventures (Brouthers, 2002; Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 
2007), but also for partial ownership acquisitions (Chiao et al., 2010; Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-
Canal, 2002; Fatica, 2010).  
Partial acquisitions allow residual ownership by some important existing shareholders or 
managers (e.g. through stock-options) who can continue to provide much needed resources and 
know-how to the ongoing concern. For example, they might have unique strategic planning and 
governance know-how related to building and maintaining the technological capabilities of their 
companies (Baysinger et al., 1991). In particular, local knowledge is highly embodied in local 
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human resources (Chen, Li and Shapiro, 2011), the management practices of which are by and 
large shaped by strong local forces. As such, a full or majority owned takeover could have 
ruinous effects on the original coalition of resource providers when the main aim of the acquiring 
firm is exploration and learning. The targeted knowledge is largely tacit in nature and hence 
difficult to assess and access. It is challenging to identify and collect promising sources of 
knowledge, put them into an adequate context and act accordingly, if linguistic, cultural and 
social barriers cause misinterpretations, mistakes and delays. These obstacles are especially 
pronounced when foreign firms search for valuable sources of innovation abroad (Al-Laham and 
Amburgey, 2005). When MNEs invest in foreign markets not to capitalize on existing 
competitive advantages but to create assets, failures in input factor markets in the host country 
may lead MNEs to form joint ventures with local firms. 
As such, it is suggested that firms that are more interested in exploring new technologies will be 
more inclined to have partial ownership. Instead, firms more interested in exploiting existing 
capabilities will be more likely to prefer majority control. Besides, negotiations with local 
partners in pooling complementary capabilities through joint ventures are time-consuming and 
require management capabilities and experience. 
As EMFs are usually laggards relative to advanced country competitors in resources, such as 
technology and brands, they are more likely to fully take over firms to compensate for 
difficulties in mobilizing local specific knowledge (Makino and Delios, 1996). Specifically, an 
EMF prefers wholly owned subsidiaries when it adopts a global strategy, faces severe industry 
competition and emphasizes asset-seeking purposes in its FDI (Cui and Jiang, 2009). It is further 
argued that a firm at an apparent disadvantage in an industry would conduct full acquisitions in 
the home nation of a firm with an apparent advantage in the industry, so as to reduce their gap by 
fully acquiring needed resources (Makino et al., 2002). 
Additionally, Cui et al. (2011) suggest that foreign industries, especially those of developed 
economies, exhibit learning opportunities of advanced technology, high-value brand assets, and 
tacit management know-how. Such factor conditions have a pull effect on emerging-market 
firms seeking complementary assets and capabilities overseas (Luo and Tung, 2007; Yamakawa 
et al., 2008). Thus, EMFs’ decision and strategy are largely influenced by the strategic intent of 
asset seeking (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009). Therefore, when the FDI of an EMF is 
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pulled by the learning opportunities in the host industry, the firm will prefer a WOS entry mode 
to fully capture those opportunities (Kim and Hwang, 1992).  
Accordingly, it is suggested here that EMFs would prefer more control of targets in more 
competitive industries. Namely, our first hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: EMFs will prefer more control when entering competitive 
industries/accessing local competences. 
 
Furthermore, full or majority ownership entry is generally preferred over joint or minority 
ownership by parent firms that have high external uncertainty due, for instance, to high cultural 
and institutional distance (Zhao et al., 2004). In other words, if the institutional environment in 
the home country and host country is similar, MNCs will feel a sense of familiarity with the 
institutional environment in the host country (Chiao et al., 2009). On the contrary, country 
differences are viewed as a barrier to obtaining local knowledge, making it difficult for the MNE 
to manage its foreign subsidiaries on its own or to enlist the help of a local partner efficiently 
(Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). 
Institutional theory studies find that firms choose modes of entry to conform to local legitimacy, 
such as rules of doing business, in host countries (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Uhlenbruck, 
Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden, 2006). Nevertheless, there is not a unanimous consensus concerning 
the effect of institutional distance on the entry mode. On the one hand, for a MNE parent the 
different institutional environment surrounding its subsidiaries represents an impediment to the 
transfer of intra-organizational practices (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and this encourages full 
ownership and greater control in order to raise the power of the parent as perceived by its 
subsidiaries (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). On the other hand, the organizational legitimacy 
perspective argues that in a very unfamiliar environment, MNEs from more dissimilar 
institutional environments tend to share ownership with a local partner in exchange for 
adaptation to the external environment (Zaheer, 1995). 
Thus, when entering a foreign market, especially if institutional distance is high, entrants often 
need local resources such as institutional or market knowledge that is embedded in existing 
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organizations (Meyer and Estrin, 2001; Anand and Delios 2002) and these can be accessed by 
forming a partnership with a local firm. However, traditional measures consider the magnitude of 
distance, and they are normally applied to AMFs investing in emerging or less developed 
countries (e.g. Meyer et al., 2009a). In those cases, large institutional distances might constitute a 
barrier to transferring organizational practices from the parent firm to the foreign subsidiary 
(Kostova, 1999). 
Here, we investigate the opposite situation, i.e. EMFs investing in advanced countries. Therefore, 
as it does not matter only how much countries differ but also how, the direction of distance 
becomes crucial (Zaheer et al., 2012). Namely, as EMFs come from countries that systematically 
lag behind on the several dimensions of institutional distance, they do not face the same 
uncertainty and risks of AMFs investing the other way round (even if the distance would assume 
the same numerical value). Thus, contrary to previous evidence about the impact of institutional 
distance on the MNC entry mode choice, we expect that EMFs investing in developed countries 
do not need to rely on a local partner to reduce uncertainty, and are more likely to adopt more 
control. Hence, our second hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: EMFs will prefer more control when institutional distance increases  
 
3. Data and methodology  
 
3.1.The sample  
 
Our hypotheses have been tested on a sample of 438 acquisitions undertaken by foreign MNEs in 
Italy between 2001 and 2010 in 78 manufacturing industries (from NACE three digit Rev.1 151 
to NACE three digit Rev.1 366)i. Data come from the dataset Reprintii, a database compiled by 
the Politecnico di Milano and sponsored by the Italian National Institute for Foreign Trade (ICE 
– Istituto per il commercio con l’estero). The database provides information about both the 
acquiring and target firms, the ownership structure, the entry mode and other balance sheet data. 
After applying the International Monetary Fundiii classification to the home country of the 
acquiring firms, it turns out that 88 out of 438 (20.09%) investments have been undertaken by 
MNEs whose country is qualified as emerging.  
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Dependent variable (Degree of Ownership) 
 We refer to the ownership structure as to the share of the equity owned by the MNEs 
after the acquisition. Following Chari and Chang (2009), we identified four different types of 
ownership: full, majority, equal, and minority ownership. Accordingly, we build a categorical 
variable, i.e. Degree of Ownership, taking value k=0,1,2,3, for minority, equal, majority and full 
ownership, respectively. As a consequence, the higher the value of the dependent variable, the 
higher is the degree of ownership and control in the target company.  
 Table 1 shows the distribution of acquisitions across the four degrees of ownership 
considered, distinguishing also between MNEs from emerging vs. advanced countries. It can be 
noticed that full ownership is in general the favorite choice. However, while the percentage of 
AMFs adopting full ownerships is around 70%, the same value decrease to 50% in case of 
EMFs, thus revealing that the latter tend to choose partnerships more frequently than the former.  
 
(Table 1 goes about here) 
 
3.2.Explanatory variables 
Competitiveness of target firm' industries  
In order to account for the competitiveness of Italian industries, we employed an indicator that 
has been originally suggested by Balassa (1965) and that is very popular among international 
trade economists, i.e. the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA). RCA index is defined as 
follows: 
RCAij = (Xij/Σj Xij)/( Σi Xij/ Σij Xij)   
where Xij are exports in sector i from country j. 
The numerator and denominator represent the share of a given sector i in national exports, and in 
world exports, respectively. Accordingly, a high index (typically above 1) implies that, given a 
sector, the national export share is higher than the world export share. As a consequence, that 
industry can be considered competitive in that country.   
To compute the RCA we employed data from the Italian National Institute for Foreign Trade at 
three digit level manufacturing industries. The RCA has been computed, for each of the 438 
observations, as the average value of the five years before that of the investments. This means 
that the average values have been computed along a range spanning from 1996-2000 for 
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investments occurred in 2001, to 2005-2009 for investment occurred in 2010. Considering the 
average value calculated upon 5 years allows us to control for fluctuations of international and 
national economy and to provide a more robust measure of competitiveness of the Italian 
industries. The highest RCAs refer to those traditional industries (e.g. house building materials 
and furniture; leather, textiles and clothing; machine tools and other machinery) that are 
internationally known as “made in Italy” (De Benedictis, 2005), while the lowest RCA refer to 
those high-tech sectors (e.g. electronics and electronic instruments, computers, communication 
equipment, basic chemicals, aerospace) that typically lag behind in Italy. According to our first 
hypothesis we expect a positive relationship between Competitiveness and the EMFs’ degree of 
ownership. 
 
Institutional Distance Variables 
Institutional distance between each home country and Italy has been accounted for by focusing 
on the market-related dimension of institutions, which is likely to be the most important 
determinant of the attractiveness of a country for a foreign firm interested in doing business. 
Specifically, we employed 9 out of the 10 items of the economic freedom index developed by the 
Heritage Foundation in partnership with the Wall Street Journal (Kane, Holmes, and O’Grady, 
2007)iv, namely: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, 
monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights and freedom from 
corruption.v Each item provides a score between 0 and 100 for each of the 184 countries 
available in the database from 1995 to 2012. We computed the distance between each home 
country and Italy both with respect to each single item and by employing a compound index 
which gather all the items and which has been named Institutional Distance.  
The Institutional Distance compound index has been computed by employing the Kogut and 
Singh (1988) formula that is typically used to gauge the cultural distance. We computed the 
Institutional Distance between the home country of each observation and Italy for each available 
year according to the following formula:  
,9//)( 2
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where jID  is the Institutional Distance for the jth country, Iij is the Heritage score of the ith item 
for the jth country, k is Italy and Vi is the variance of the ith score. Following the same rationale 
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of RCA, we finally computed, for each observation, the average value of the Institutional 
Distance for the five years before that of the investment, in order to control for possible 
fluctuations. The distance with respect to each item has been computed according to the same 
procedure, of course without applying the sum and the denominator in the formula.  
 Table 2 provides the list of the ten institutional distance variables employed in the 
analysis, including the compound index. For each variable we reported the description of the 
item that has been employed to compute the distance, the average value of the items for Italy, 
EMFs and AMFs between 2001 and 2010 and the average distance between EMFs and Italy, on 
the one hand, and between AMFs and Italy, on the other hand. The distance variables have been 
grouped in four broad categories that are suggested by the Heritage Index, i.e. Rule of law, 
Limited Government, Regulatory efficiency and Open markets. It can be noticed that the 
compound index, which is reported at the bottom of the table, shows that, as expected, Italy is on 
average much closer to advanced than to emerging countries. This picture arises also from the 
other nine distance variables, which nearly always show that Italy is closer to advanced than to 
emerging countries, with the noticeable exception of Freedom From Corruption with respect to 
which Italy is closer to emerging than to advanced economies. As regards the scores, Italy is 
placed nearly always above the emerging countries and below the advanced economies, with the 
exception of Fiscal Freedom and Government Spending whose scores are below the value of 
both advanced and emerging economies.  
 According to our second hypothesis, we expect a positive relationship between 
institutional distance and the EMFs’ higher degree of control.   
 
3.3.Control variables 
Target company level 
Size (Size) 
Large target firms imply larger financing constraint for the acquirer, which hence may prefer 
minority acquisitions (Whited, 2006). This choice is also driven by the possibility to reduce risks 
and costs that arise from acquisition of large firms, which imply more irreversible investments 
(Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). A gradual approach allows, indeed, reacting more rapidly to 
market changes and implementing more easily the exit strategy if needed (Folta, 1998, Tse et al., 
1997). Furthermore, a partial acquisition represents the starting point to gradually increase the 
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equity share and to complete the acquisition if desired by the firm (Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991). As 
a consequence, we expect a negative relationship between the degree of ownership and the size. 
Data on the size of the target company come from Reprint Database, and refer to the number of 
employees (as at the year of acquisition). 
 
Target Company High-Tech Industries  
We control for the technology intensity of the industry of the target firms to assess whether the 
ownership strategy of EMFs and AMFs is different when they enter high-tech industries rather 
than competitive industries. Indeed, while the latter rely mainly on traditional sectors where 
Italian firms can offer knowledge and competences, the former refer to high-tech industries 
where, on average, Italian firms lag behind with respect to foreign competitors. As a 
consequence, we expect an opposite behavior with respect to competitive industries as regards 
the ownership strategy. Specifically, it is likely that, at least as far as AMFs are concerned, the 
high-tech industries will be subject more to full rather than to partial acquisitions. A different 
output may derive from EMFs, which are likely, on average, to lag behind Italian firms also in 
high-tech industries. 
In order to account for the technology intensity of target firms’ industries, we employed a 
dummy taking value of 1 when the industry of the target firm is classified as high-tech or 
medium-high-tech according to the Eurostat-OECD (2007) classification.vi Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the 438 foreign direct investments between high-tech and non-high-tech target 
firms’ industries and across the four degrees of ownership for EMFs, for AMFs and for the 
whole sample. It can be noticed that foreign direct investments are directed more to non high-
tech than to high-tech industries in all group of MFs. However, EMFs seem to slightly prefer full 
ownership in non high-tech compared to high-tech industries (51.92% and 47.22%, respectively), 
while the opposite is true as regards advanced MNEs, which tend to adopt a full ownership more 
in high-tech than in non high-tech sectors (72.55% and 67.51%, respectively). 
 
(Table 2 goes about here) 
 
Parent company level  
Parent Company High-Tech Industries 
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Studies adopting RBV find that firms that possess more advantageous capabilities (e.g., 
knowledge, experience) are more likely to choose full control of foreign subsidiaries (Erramilli, 
1991). Multinationals with higher R&D intensity and asset specificity, such as tacit know-how, 
tend, indeed, to prefer full or majority ownership entry over joint or minority ownership of their 
foreign subsidiaries (Zhao et al., 2004; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Findings, in general, are 
that MNCs are more likely to get majority share when they possess certain assets that are needed 
by the host countries, such as technology or links with global networks (Blodgett, 1991). 
Therefore, we control for the technological intensity of the parent company’s industry through a 
dummy variable, Parent Tech, taking value of 1 if the parent company operates in a high- or 
medium-tech industry according to the Eurostat-OECD (2007). Table 3 shows the distribution of 
the 438 acquisitions between high and non high-tech industries and across the four degree of 
ownership for emerging MNEs, advanced MNEs and for the whole sample. EMFs adopting the 
full ownership strategy are equally distributed between non high- and high-tech industries, while 
high-tech AMFs seems to prefer full ownership much more than non high-tech AMFs (77.47% 
vs. 61.31%).  
(Table 4 goes about here) 
 
Experience (Experience) 
Some empirical studies support the notion that less experienced foreign investors prefer shared 
ownership (Meyer, 2001), while others (e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) found no direct link 
between international experience and the propensity to choose full acquisition over partial 
acquisition. For firms that have already established operations in a country, any new acquisition 
would aim to extend the existing operations, for instance, by increasing market share or by 
deepening the local supply chain. Therefore, one would expect more control to be important in 
order to allow for the necessary restructuring/alignment. Internationally experienced firms are 
more capable of committing resources in acquisitions and operating alone. Small-sized and 
inexperienced firms often have a need to augment their capability by that of another firm which 
correspondingly faces capability constraints (Madhok, 1998). Equity ownership is seen as an 
outcome of negotiation, a representation of relative power between participating interests. 
Participants gain power from their commitment of various resources, such as technology, 
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marketing expertise, access to financial markets, and geographical or industrial experience. 
Therefore we expect a positive correlation between experience and the degree of ownership.  
Experience of multinational firms in the local context has been measured through the variable 
Local Experience, a dummy taking value of 1 if the companies have already undertaken at least 
one previous investment in Italy, and 0 otherwise. Data on previous local experience come from 
the database Reprint. Table 5 reports the number of experienced and inexperienced EMFs and 
AMFs for each degree of ownership, thus showing that the former are, as expected, much more 
inexperienced than AMFs.  
 
(Table 5 goes about here) 
 
Finally, we controlled for fixed-effects that may arise from the economic cycle by introducing 
nine dummy variables (year_2001 to year_2009), thus using year 2010 as benchmark. 
 
3.4 Model and methodology 
 
To test our hypotheses, we employed the following equation model:  
iiii ControlsceDisenessCompetitivOwnershipofDegree εββββ ++++= 3210 tan  
where i=1, 2,…438 are the deals; Degree of Ownership is the dependent variable; 
Competitiveness is the measure of the competitiveness of the target firm’ industry, Distance is 
one of the 10 measures of institutional distances described in previous section, Controls are the 
control variables described above, and ε is the error term. The equation has been tested 
separately for EMFs and for AMFs, thus giving birth to two models of 88 and 350 observations, 
respectively.   
Given the nature of our dependent variable, we employed a robust ordered probit econometric 
model, which allows controlling for the heteroskedasticity of the sample that derives from the 
variety of target and acquiring firms’ industries and of parent firms’ home countries.  
Table 6a and 6b provide the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the EMFs and AMFs equation models, respectively.  
 
(Tables 6a and 6b goes about here) 
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4. Econometric findings  
Table 7a and Table 7b show the estimated coefficients of the ordered probit models applied to 
EMFs and AMFs, respectively.  
First of all, it is worth observing that Competitiveness exhibits a positive and significant 
correlation with Degree of Ownership (at p <0.01) in Table 7a for EMFs, while a negative and 
significant correlation for AMFs (at p <0.01, see Table 7b), thus providing evidence for 
Hypothesis 1. 
This result confirms that, when the target firms operate in industries where the host country has 
accumulated distinctive resources, so that opportunities to learn and to explore new competences 
are high, EMFs prefer to adopt higher control and ownership in order to entirely capture local 
competencies without the burden of managing the local partnership; conversely, AMFs prefer 
lower ownership mode in order to maximize the likelihood of preserving and accessing the local 
assets embodied in the target company. 
As far as the role of institutional distance, our results confirm that the aggregate index does not 
provide any relevant evidence: in fact, the variable Institutional Distance does not come out 
significant neither in Table 7a (i.e. for EMFs) nor in Table 7b (i.e. for AMFs). 
Instead, some interesting results seem to emerge when adopting the single dimensions directly in 
the regression models. Namely, property rights and investment freedom distances exhibit a 
positive correlation with the dependent variable (at p<0.01 in table 7a and at p<0.05 in table 7b, 
respectively). These two items reflect two very critical aspects of the emerging countries 
economy, i.e. the weak intellectual property regime and market-based economy. Indeed, on the 
one hand, when EMFs invest in advanced countries, they take advantage of the stronger 
intellectual property regime by adopting a full ownership strategy in order to acquire intangible 
assets that would be more difficult to develop in their home country due to the limits in 
knowledge appropriation. On the other hand, EMFs take advantage of the transparency and 
freedom of advanced countries’ market-based economy to undertake full acquisitions that would 
be subject to more controls and limitations in their home country due to a higher state control 
(especially in Russia and China).  
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As regards AMFs, we find a very weak positive correlation with respect to property right 
distance and government spending distance (p<0.10). Conversely, trade freedom distance shows 
a strong negative correlation (p<0.05) with the dependent variable, thus confirming the finding 
of organizational legitimacy perspective, according to which MNEs from dissimilar institutional 
environments prefer a partial ownership strategy in order to ensure a better adaptation in the 
external environment (Zaheer, 1995). 
Concerning control variables, our econometric findings confirm only in one case (column 2 in 
table 7a) that high-tech parent company prefer a full acquisition to avoid dispersion of 
knowledge that may arise from a partial acquisition (p<0.10). Conversely, when the target firm is 
high-tech, EMFs prefer partial acquisition (p<0.10). Unlike competitive industries, where the 
type of knowledge is less technology-intensive, high tech-industries require high absorption 
capacities that EMFs on average do not possess. Partial acquisitions allow EMFs not only to 
acquire knowledge but also to develop the absorption capacities by interacting with the local 
partner.  
As regards the size, as expected the larger the target firm the more is the probability to undertake 
partial acquisitions, even if this variable is relevant only for AMFs.  
Finally, as far as multinationals’ previous experience in the host country, our results show a lack 
of significance. However, this is quite in line with the uncertain findings put forward in the 
literature so far. In fact, some empirical studies support the notion that less experienced foreign 
investors prefer shared ownership (Meyer, 2001), while others (e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998) found no direct link between international experience and the propensity to choose full 
acquisition over partial acquisition. Besides, for firms that have already established operations in 
a country, any new acquisition would aim to extend the existing operations, for instance, by 
increasing market share or by deepening the local supply chain. Therefore, one would expect 
more control to be important in order to allow for the necessary restructuring/alignment (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
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This article is about foreign multinationals acquiring firms in advanced economies. In particular, 
it has examined the acquisition behavior of emerging market firms compared to advanced market 
firms in Italy. 
The growing importance of asset-seeking investments suggests that advanced countries have 
grown in importance as destination; especially for emerging markets’ firms, given that more 
advanced economies have more to offer in terms of technologies, capabilities and managerial 
skills (Dunning et al., 1998). The transition of a number of emerging economies from a phase of 
adaptive R&D based on imported technologies in the past to the accumulation of indigenous 
innovative capabilities has its limitations as much of these innovative activities centered more on 
process developments than expanding product development capabilities (Pradhan, 2011). In fact, 
the recent boom in overseas acquisitions by these firms in advanced countries partially represents 
their strategic motivation for acquiring new products, skills and technologies to overcome their 
existing inadequate product development capabilities. The relative disadvantages of EMFs are 
precisely the propellers of FDI, seen as an effective mean to equip firms with the competitive 
strength that they lack. In the case of EMFs, it is worth noticing the importance of acquisitions as 
a route towards international markets, as these lend the fastest access to markets, technology, 
R&D skills and international brands. 
Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that, when acquiring a foreign company, a 
MNE wishing to avoid the dispersion of the bundle of information and knowledge residing in the 
target company is more likely to preserve the value of the target firm’s resources by undertaking 
a partial (rather than a complete) acquisition. This is particularly true when MNEs adopt 
competence exploring strategies, and they experience important opportunities to learn from local 
target companies. Within this context, the degree of ownership and control that foreign MNEs 
maintain on the local target firm becomes a crucial dimension (Brown et al., 2003; Shrader, 
2001). As such, the current analysis focuses upon the ownership and control decision of EMFs 
and AMFs in their acquisition behavior of Italian firms in traditionally competitive industries. 
Such foreign acquisitions by emerging market firms with weak product development capabilities 
are likely to be for accessing new products, technologies, brands and skills needed for facing 
immediate market competition, besides accessing new markets. 
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Our analysis thereby demonstrates that EMFs adopt a different entry strategy from that of 
Advanced Market Firms, even when they are driven by similar motivations. As such, the results 
show that EMFs prefer a higher ownership percentage as compared to AMFs that do indeed 
prefer lower ownership control when investing in particularly competitive industries. 
EMFs prefer more control over asset-seeking acquisitions as they lack the needed experience to 
deal with the relevant complexity of managing partnerships. Hence, EMFs are more likely to 
prefer a greater degree of ownership and control in the local target company. 
Although these EMFs seem to increasingly acquire firms in technologically advanced countries, 
this does not automatically imply the active augmentation of existing ownership advantages 
through reverse transfers of R&D. These firms may make strategic investments that may provide 
no discernible economic contribution to the MNE as a whole, besides their long term market 
positioning, through M&A (Narula and Dunning, 2009). 
However, despite their clear preference for more ownership, research has shown that they have 
allowed the acquisitions to remain separate organizations, and have given them almost complete 
operational freedom even when they are in the same or related businesses. They assume that 
incumbent teams know their customers, organizations, and rivals best. This entails keeping an 
acquisition structurally separate and maintaining its own identity and organization. The acquirers 
retain the senior executives, particularly the CEOs, of the corporations they buy and give them 
the same power and autonomy they used to enjoy (Kale, Sing and Raman, 2009). 
So despite their preference for more control, most emerging multinationals do everything they 
can to keep top teams intact. That, they believe, shows the buyer’s confidence in the company, 
its strategy, and the quality of its talent. This approach is becoming a hallmark of EMFs’ reverse 
takeovers, even helping emerging giants win takeover battles, as target firms can benefit from the 
higher financial input while retaining the necessary strategic leeway. It also dispels any notion 
that poor performance in some way led to the takeover. As a result, the acquirers don’t lose 
human and social capital or the team’s industry- and company-specific knowledge; in fact, they 
can harness all that for the benefit of both parties. 
As far as institutional distance is concerned, although several studies have already complemented 
TCE and RBV variables with institutional variables (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Meyer, 
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2001, Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), only few have acknowledged and captured the complexity of 
the constructs (Meyer et al., 2009a; Zaheer et al., 2012). Our results show indeed that complex 
indexes of institutional distance may hinder those sources of societal difference that actually 
impact MNCs’ entry mode choice. Additionally, EMFs experience a higher propensity to control 
the local partner the higher the institutional distance in terms of property rights and investment 
freedom with the host country. In fact, as EMFs investing in advanced countries enjoy a better 
institutional environment there, they are less likely to need a local partner (to reduce the relevant 
uncertainty). 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Degree of ownership of the 438 foreign direct investments by MNEs’ home country. 
Degree of Ownership EMFs AMFs Total 
Minority ownership 11 48 59 
% 12.50 13.71 13.47 
Equal Ownership 13 9 22 
% 14.77 2.57 5.02 
Majority ownership 20 49 69 
% 22.73 14.00 15.75 
Full ownership 44 244 288 
% 50.00 69.71 65.75 
Total 88 350 438 
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Table 2: List and values of the institutional distance variables with description of the related items 
Variable of 
Distance  
Description of the item employed in the 
index 
Average Score 
of the Item for 
Italy (2001-
2010) 
Average Score 
of the Item for 
EMFs (2001-
2010) 
Average Score 
of the Item for 
AMFs (2001-
2010) 
Average 
distance 
between EMFs 
and Italy  
Average 
distance 
between AMFs 
and Italy  
Institutional 
Distance Compound index of all items - - - 2.137 0.739 
Rule of law  
Property Rights The extent to which private property rights are 
recognized and protected by rule of law  60.500 50.760 84.130 1.106 0.869 
Freedom from 
Corruption 
Openness in regulatory procedures and 
processes that ensure transparencies and 
promote equitable treatment and greater 
regulatory efficiency and speed. 
50.000 44.020 78.540 0.749 1.750 
Limited government  
Fiscal Freedom 
The extent to which individuals and businesses 
are permitted by government to keep and 
control their income and wealth for their own 
benefit and use 
51.250 79.110 59.500 1.312 1.168 
Government 
spending 
The extent to which government spending is 
excessive and generate high levels of public 
debt that undermine economic freedom and 
stifle growth. 
29.610 69.300 44.190 4.258 1.161 
Regulatory efficiency  
Business 
Freedom 
The extent to which individuals are able to 
establish and run an enterprise without 
interference (e.g. burdensome and redundant 
regulations) from the state.  
73.900 67.070 82.350 1.462 0.554 
Monetary 
Freedom 
The extent to which the economy can rely on a 
stable currency, market-determined prices, low 
inflation and independent central bank 
83.230 75.860 84.140 0.879 0.037 
(continue) 
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Variable of 
Distance  
Description of the item employed in the 
index 
Average Value 
of the Item for 
Italy (2001-
2010) 
Average Value 
of the Item for 
EMFs (2001-
2010) 
Average Value 
of the Item for 
AMFs (2001-
2010) 
Average 
distance 
between EMFs 
and Italy (2001-
2010) 
Average 
distance 
between AMFs 
and Italy (2001-
2010) 
 
Open Markets  
Trade Freedom 
Economy’s openness to the import of goods 
and services from around the world and 
citizen’s ability to interact freely as buyer or 
seller in the international marketplace without 
trade restrictions such as tariffs, export taxes, 
trade quotas, or outright trade bans 
81.230 71.190 82.030 3.518 0.025 
Investment 
Freedom 
The extent to which the economic environment 
is characterized by transparency and equity and 
provides maximum entrepreneurial 
opportunities and incentives for expanded 
economic activity, greater productivity and job 
creation, without restrictions on the movement 
of capital 
70.500 49.740 73.310 2.267 0.411 
Financial 
Freedom 
The extent to which financial and banking 
systems are transparent, open and efficient,  64.000 50.000 70.810 2.083 0.828 
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Table 3: Degree of ownership of the 438 foreign direct investments by technology intensity of target 
firm’s industry and by MNEs’ home country. 
 
EMFs AMFs Total 
Degree of 
Ownership 
Target Non 
High-Tech 
Target 
High Tech  
Target Non 
High-Tech 
Target 
High Tech  
Target Non 
High-Tech 
Target 
High Tech 
Minority ownership 5 6 
 
35 13 
 
40 19 
% 9.62 16.67 
 
17.77 8.50 
 
16.06 10.05 
Equal Ownership 9 4 
 
1 8 
 
10 12 
% 17.31 11.11 
 
0.51 5.23 
 
4.02 6.35 
Majority ownership 11 9 
 
28 21 
 
39 30 
% 21.15 25.00 
 
14.21 13.73 
 
15.66 15.87 
Full ownership 27 17 
 
133 111 
 
160 128 
% 51.92 47.22 
 
67.51 72.55 
 
64.26 67.72 
Total 52 36 197 153 249 189 
 
 
Table 4: Degree of ownership of the 438 foreign direct investments by technology intensity of parent 
firm’s industry and by MFs’ home country. 
 
 
EMFs 
 
AMFs 
 
Total 
Degree of 
Ownership 
Parent Non 
High-Tech 
Parent 
High Tech  
Parent Non 
High-Tech 
Parent 
High Tech  
Parent Non 
High-Tech 
Parent 
High Tech 
Minority ownership 6 5 
 
34 14 
 
40 19 
% 13.64 11.36 
 
20.24 7.69 
 
18.87 8.41 
Equal Ownership 5 8 
 
3 6 
 
8 14 
% 11.36 18.18 
 
1.79 3.30 
 
3.77 6.19 
Majority ownership 11 9 
 
28 21 
 
39 30 
% 25.00 20.45 
 
16.67 11.54 
 
18.40 13.27 
Full ownership 22 22 
 
103 141 
 
125 163 
% 50.00 50.00 
 
61.31 77.47 
 
58.96 72.12 
Total 44 44 168 182 212 226 
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Table 5: Degree of ownership of the 438 foreign direct investments by local experience of parent firm’s 
industry and by MFs’ home country. 
 
 EMFs AMFs Total 
Degree of 
Ownership 
Without 
Local 
Experience 
With Local 
Experience  
Without 
Local 
Experience 
With Local 
Experience  
Without 
Local 
Experience 
With Local 
Experience 
Minority ownership 8 3 
 
9 39 
 
17 42 
% 12.90 11.54 
 
8.82 15.73 
 
10.37 15.33 
Equal Ownership 5 8 
 
3 6 
 
8 14 
% 8.06 30.77 
 
2.94 2.42 
 
4.88 5.11 
Majority ownership 16 4 
 
14 35 
 
30 39 
% 25.81 15.38 
 
13.73 14.11 
 
18.29 14.23 
Full ownership 33 11 
 
76 168 
 
109 179 
% 53.23 42.31 
 
74.51 67.74 
 
66.46 65.33 
Total 62 26 
 
102 248 
 
164 274 
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Table 6a: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables employed in the EMFs’ equation model 
    1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 
1) Degree of Ownership  1.0000 
2) Competitiveness  0.4110 1.0000 
3) Institutional Distance 0.1817 0.1967 1.0000 
4) Property Rights  0.2560 0.1272 0.3317 1.0000 
5) Freedom from Corruption  0.0571 0.0530 0.6372 0.2004 1.0000 
6) Fiscal Freedom  -0.1258 -0.1640 0.2979 -0.1069 0.4827 1.0000 
7) Government Spending  0.1392 0.2087 0.3376 0.3799 -0.0961 -0.2946 1.0000 
8) Business Freedom  0.1085 0.1235 0.4807 0.1869 0.3387 -0.0163 0.5294 1.0000 
9) Monetary Freedom  0.0101 -0.0007 0.0941 0.2482 0.2310 0.1829 -0.4621 -0.1883 1.0000 
10) Trade Freedom  0.1009 0.1805 0.5541 -0.2913 0.2515 -0.1918 0.0252 0.1623 -0.1815 1.0000 
11) Investment Freedom  0.1647 0.1152 0.3219 0.5771 -0.0360 -0.0846 0.4879 0.3498 -0.1732 -0.1903 1.0000 
12) Financial Freedom  0.2400 0.2176 0.8047 0.4697 0.3491 0.0198 0.2314 0.2178 0.1595 0.4742 0.4140 1.0000 
13) Size -0.2005 -0.2539 0.0276 0.0244 0.1459 0.3308 -0.2793 -0.1054 0.2264 -0.1154 -0.0573 0.0349 1.0000 
14) Target Tech -0.0581 -0.0225 0.0984 0.1366 0.0199 0.0004 0.1994 0.0854 -0.0064 -0.0619 0.0770 0.0733 -0.0812 1.0000 
15) Parent Tech -0.0107 0.0708 0.0677 0.0585 -0.0974 -0.3041 0.4038 0.2914 -0.2804 0.0848 0.1699 0.0424 -0.1552 0.5085 1.0000 
16) Local Experience -0.1322 -0.0713 -0.0087 -0.3190 0.0327 0.1195 0.0145 0.1157 -0.2398 0.1421 -0.2276 -0.2542 -0.0205 -0.0322 0.0498 1.0000 
Obs. 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Mean 2.1023 1.7601 2.1366 1.1064 0.7494 3.6049 4.2580 1.4620 0.8792 3.5183 2.2669 2.0827 205.5227 0.4091 0.5000 0.2955 
Std. Dev. 1.0725 0.8148 0.6492 0.8753 0.4388 2.8123 2.0673 0.8504 1.4843 4.1322 1.4452 0.9736 382.5616 0.4945 0.5029 0.4589 
Min 0.0000 0.1060 0.2913 0.0087 0.0139 0.2970 0.0803 0.0000 0.0100 0.0012 0.0000 0.1606 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Max 3.0000 3.5180 3.3647 2.8839 1.9196 11.5455 8.7487 4.8919 7.8693 13.1374 4.4232 3.7361 2707.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 6b: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables employed in the AMFs’ equation model 
    1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 
1) Degree of Ownership  1.0000 
2) Competitiveness  -0.1708 1.0000 
3) Institutional Distance 0.1673 -0.1721 1.0000 
4) Property Rights  0.2628 -0.2252 0.6613 1.0000 
5) Freedom from Corruption  0.0355 -0.2122 0.4829 0.3387 1.0000 
6) Fiscal Freedom  0.0601 -0.0685 0.7216 0.2840 0.2527 1.0000 
7) Government Spending  0.1125 -0.1193 0.6604 0.2152 0.0340 0.5271 1.0000 
8) Business Freedom  0.0744 -0.1292 0.6111 0.2093 0.1158 0.2412 0.5695 1.0000 
9) Monetary Freedom  0.0404 0.0591 0.2254 0.1559 0.2258 0.3419 0.0155 -0.2057 1.0000 
10) Trade Freedom  -0.0245 -0.0156 0.2973 0.4019 0.1105 0.2960 0.1913 -0.0867 0.2085 1.0000 
11) Investment Freedom  -0.0788 0.3295 -0.3330 -0.2115 -0.2798 -0.3011 -0.5263 -0.2693 0.0318 -0.2063 1.0000 
12) Financial Freedom  0.0835 0.1367 0.3376 0.3275 -0.0905 0.1658 -0.0353 0.1857 0.1252 0.0376 0.1775 1.0000 
13) Size -0.1027 -0.1078 0.0348 0.0385 0.0431 0.0204 0.0278 0.0588 -0.0463 0.0221 -0.1013 -0.0169 1.0000 
14) Target Tech 0.0886 -0.5081 0.0765 0.1332 -0.0820 0.0411 0.0989 0.1125 -0.1002 0.0266 -0.1716 0.0020 0.1064 1.0000 
15) Parent Tech 0.1881 -0.3633 0.0932 0.2551 -0.0427 0.0284 0.0066 0.0902 -0.0448 0.0773 -0.1132 0.0925 0.1110 0.4317 1.0000 
16) Local Experience -0.0863 0.1377 -0.0581 -0.0265 0.0392 -0.0942 -0.1558 -0.0915 0.0129 -0.1028 0.2103 0.1258 0.0397 -0.0939 -0.0247 1.0000 
Obs. 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Mean 2.3971 1.3908 0.7391 0.8695 1.7504 0.9275 1.1609 0.5544 0.0367 0.0247 0.4108 0.8276 129.9514 0.4371 0.5200 0.7086 
Std. Dev. 1.0568 0.9604 0.2985 0.6896 1.0094 0.9472 1.0638 0.6003 0.0432 0.0472 0.4466 0.4838 362.9756 0.4967 0.5003 0.4551 
Min 0.0000 0.0400 0.1695 0.0000 0.1125 0.0158 0.0074 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Max 3.0000 7.5100 2.5297 2.6015 4.4812 6.4869 6.7261 4.1112 0.3276 0.6624 1.1058 2.6887 4740.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 7a: Results of the robust Ordered Probit model applied to EMFs’ sample – Institutional distance 
(1), property right distance (2), freedom from corruption distance (3), fiscal freedom distance (4) and 
global spending distance (5).  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Competitiveness 0.527*** 0.563*** 0.564*** 0.562*** 0.539*** 
  
(2.95) (3.15) (3.26) (3.25) (3.05) 
Institutional distance 0.234 
    
  
(0.87) 
    Institutional distance Items:      
 
Property Rights 
 
0.530*** 
   
   
(2.73) 
   
 
Freedom from corruption 
  
0.012 
  
    
(0.04) 
  
 
Fiscal Freedom 
   
-0.024 
 
     
(-0.42) 
 
 
Government Spending 
    
0.132 
      
(1.64) 
       Size -0.081 -0.068 -0.069 -0.055 -0.029 
  
(-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.80) (-0.65) (-0.35) 
Target Tech -0.435 -0.516* -0.421 -0.401 -0.489 
  
(-1.46) (-1.68) (-1.43) (-1.36) (-1.62) 
Parent Tech 0.424 0.534* 0.454 0.415 0.369 
  
(1.34) (1.69) (1.44) (1.30) (1.16) 
Local Experience -0.167 0.271 -0.154 -0.121 -0.016 
  
(-0.54) (0.77) (-0.50) (-0.38) (-0.05) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant cut1 -1.093 -1.265* -1.317* -1.406* -0.958 
  
(-1.46) (-1.81) (-1.84) (-1.86) (-1.22) 
Constant cut2 -0.315 -0.449 -0.545 -0.632 -0.178 
  
(-0.42) (-0.65) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-0.23) 
Constant cut3 0.450 0.358 0.212 0.126 0.601 
  
(0.59) (0.51) (0.30) (0.17) (0.76) 
       N. of observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
Chi2 426.963 399.748 436.081 440.955 435.975 
P>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects are available upon request. 
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Table 7b: Results of the robust Ordered Probit model applied to EMFs’ sample – Business Freedom 
Distance (6), Monetary Freedom Distance (7), Trade Freedom Distance (8), Investment Freedom 
Distance (9) and Financial freedom distance (10). 
    (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Competitiveness  0.538*** 0.565*** 0.586*** 0.559*** 0.518*** 
  
(3.06)    (3.26)    (3.32)    (3.29)    (2.96)    
Institutional distance items: 
     
       
 
Business Freedom 0.194    
    
  
(1.15)    
    
 
Monetary Freedom 
 
-0.032    
   
   
(-0.25)    
   
 
Trade Freedom 
  
-0.021    
  
    
(-0.59)    
  
 
Investment Freedom 
   
0.228**  
 
     
(2.21)    
 
 
Financial Freedom 
    
0.300    
      
(1.47)    
Size -0.069    -0.064    -0.068    -0.058    -0.083    
  
(-0.79)    (-0.70)    (-0.76)    (-0.66)    (-0.97)    
Target Tech -0.421    -0.415    -0.449    -0.468    -0.439    
  
(-1.45)    (-1.41)    (-1.52)    (-1.53)    (-1.45)    
Parent Tech 0.396    0.436    0.501    0.459    0.404    
  
(1.25)    (1.33)    (1.49)    (1.44)    (1.26)    
Local Experience -0.170    -0.159    -0.106    0.085    -0.048    
  
(-0.55)    (-0.51)    (-0.33)    (0.27)    (-0.15)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Constant cut1 -1.164*   -1.352*   -1.286*   -0.969    -1.244*   
  
(-1.71)    (-1.86)    (-1.79)    (-1.37)    (-1.82)    
Constant cut2 -0.380    -0.580    -0.517    -0.179    -0.451    
  
(-0.56)    (-0.82)    (-0.73)    (-0.25)    (-0.67)    
Constant cut3 0.383    0.180    0.243    0.612    0.323    
  
(0.56)    (0.25)    (0.34)    (0.85)    (0.47)    
       N. of observations 88.000    88.000    88.000    88.000    88.000    
Chi2 422.587    434.738    438.073    382.565    431.859    
P>Chi2  0.000    0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects are available upon request. 
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Table 8a: Results of the robust Ordered Probit model applied to AMFs’ sample – Institutional distance 
(1), property right distance (2), freedom from corruption distance (3), fiscal freedom distance (4) and 
global spending distance (5).  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Competitiveness  -0.208*** -0.182*** -0.199*** -0.221*** -0.211*** 
  
(-3.11)    (-2.64)    (-2.81)    (-3.33)    (-3.14)    
Institutional distance 0.273    
    
  
(0.93)    
    
 
Property rights 
 
0.328*   
   
   
(1.79)    
   
 
Freedom from corruption 
  
0.060    
  
    
(0.74)    
  
 
Fiscal Freedom 
   
0.020    
 
     
(0.24)    
 
 
Government Spending 
    
0.131*   
      
(1.72)    
       Size -0.114**  -0.115**  -0.113**  -0.112**  -0.114**  
  
(-2.37)    (-2.39)    (-2.36)    (-2.32)    (-2.33)    
Target Tech -0.150    -0.138    -0.136    -0.163    -0.169    
  
(-0.89)    (-0.81)    (-0.79)    (-0.97)    (-1.00)    
Parent Tech 0.229    0.215    0.243    0.232    0.230    
  
(1.45)    (1.35)    (1.53)    (1.47)    (1.45)    
Local Experience -0.097    -0.109    -0.113    -0.107    -0.044    
  
(-0.59)    (-0.66)    (-0.68)    (-0.64)    (-0.26)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
       Constant cut1 -5.849*** -5.260*** -6.009*** -6.139*** -5.948*** 
  
(-15.81)    (-14.04)    (-21.32)    (-26.85)    (-24.75)    
  
                                          
                            
Constant cut2 -5.720*** -5.131*** -5.880*** -6.011*** -5.818*** 
  
(-15.60)    (-13.89)    (-21.15)    (-26.98)    (-24.83)    
  
                                          
                            
Constant cut3 -5.180*** -4.588*** -5.341*** -5.472*** -5.273*** 
  
(-14.40)    (-12.62)    (-19.82)    (-25.83)    (-23.68)    
       N. of obsevrations 350.000    350.000    350.000    350.000    350.000    
Chi2 2340.704   1580.978   2080.156   2147.058   2220.647   
P>Chi2 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects are available upon request. 
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Table 8b: Results of the robust Ordered Probit model applied to AMFs’ sample – Business Freedom 
Distance (6), Monetary Freedom Distance (7), Trade Freedom Distance (8), Investment Freedom 
Distance (9) and Financial freedom distance (10). 
    (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Competitiveness  -0.217*** -0.222*** -0.225*** -0.193*** -0.219*** 
  
(-3.28)    (-3.35)    (-3.41)    (-2.87)    (-3.13)    
Institutional distance 
     
       
 
Business Freedom 0.112    
    
  
(0.74)    
    
 
Monetary Freedom 
 
-1.000    
   
   
(-0.66)    
   
 
Trade Freedom 
  
-4.346**  
  
    
(-2.14)    
  
 
Investment Freedom 
   
-0.214    
 
     
(-1.22)    
 
 
Financial Freedom 
    
-0.028    
      
(-0.16)    
       Size -0.115**  -0.112**  -0.110**  -0.117**  -0.111**  
  
(-2.36)    (-2.33)    (-2.33)    (-2.41)    (-2.31)    
Target Tech -0.163    -0.177    -0.185    -0.163    -0.164    
  
(-0.97)    (-1.05)    (-1.10)    (-0.97)    (-0.97)    
Parent Tech 0.218    0.226    0.230    0.231    0.234    
  
(1.38)    (1.43)    (1.46)    (1.45)    (1.47)    
Local Experience -0.094    -0.109    -0.156    -0.062    -0.106    
  
(-0.56)    (-0.66)    (-0.92)    (-0.36)    (-0.64)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
       Constant cut1 -6.089*** -6.226*** -6.450*** -5.971*** -6.190*** 
  
(-25.86)    (-26.62)    (-19.45)    (-26.97)    (-20.93)    
Constant cut2 -5.960*** -6.097*** -6.320*** -5.843*** -6.061*** 
  
(-25.98)    (-26.78)    (-19.35)    (-27.21)    (-20.92)    
Constant cut3 -5.421*** -5.558*** -5.775*** -5.302*** -5.523*** 
  
(-24.74)    (-25.84)    (-18.40)    (-26.26)    (-19.78)    
       N of observations 350.000    350.000    350.000    350.000    350.000    
Chi2 2277.144   2223.369   1829.284   2059.790   2065.129   
P> Chi2 0.000   0.000    0.000    0.000  0.000    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects are available upon request. 
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NOTES 
 
i
 Foreign acquisitions undertaken by private equity firms, venture capitalists and funds have been excluded since 
their rationales are likely to be different with respect to MNEs. 
ii
 The database Reprint provides data on both the foreign affiliates of Italian firms and the Italian affiliates of foreign 
firms since 1986 and is yearly updated (for details see Mariotti and Mutinelli, 2010) 
iii
 We employed the classification provided at the beginning of the period (2001) by the World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) Database of International Monetary Fund, which is available at the following link: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 
iv
 The Heritage Foundation is a Washington think tank which provides, since 1995, indicators of the economic 
freedom for 184 countries. More details are available at the following website: http://www.heritage.org/index/   
v
 The tenth item, i.e. labour freedom, has not been employed since data concerning this dimension of economic 
freedom are available only since 2005, while investments considered in our database range from 2001 to 2010.   
vi
 According to Eurostat-OECD classification (2007), the high-tech industries are: aerospace, computers, office 
machinery, electronics-communications, pharmaceuticals and scientific instruments. The medium-high tech 
industries are: motor vehicles, electrical machinery, chemicals, other transport equipment and non-electrical 
machinery 
